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Abstract 
Research productivity is not constant over the lifetime of a researcher but fluctuates substantially and often 
seems to follow a typical pattern as shown firstly by Lehman (1953, 1958, 1966) and later on by many 
others like Cole (1979), Dennis (1956), Kenny/Studley (1995); Oster/Hamermesh (1998) or Buchmuel-
ler/Dominitz/Hansen (1999). However, despite stable aggregate patterns there is substantial variation of 
research output across individuals. The aim of our paper is twofold. We try to identify systematic differ-
ences in individual research productivity and to explain them with differences in career incentives. We 
develop a theoretical model in which research productivity is driven by a combination of incentives to 
invest in skills and/or to produce output, both of which depend on institutional characteristics of the na-
tional university systems and their respective career paths. From our model we derive testable hypotheses 
on variations in individual research productivity profiles within and across countries. We test our implica-
tions based on a unique data set which we collected for 112 (business) economists in the US and 189 in 
Germany. We find that very effective incentives to publish are provided by promotion tournaments in the 
US as well as in Germany. In general this leads to elevated publication outputs in time periods preceding a 
major promotion and reduced publication productivity afterwards. But we also find striking differences 
between US and German researchers. Skill acquisition is more important for German researchers in the 
screening period since the first promotion decision is also strongly influenced by a qualification require-
ment, the so-called Habilitation. Also, German researchers lack a second major career step in comparison 
to US researchers, for whom a promotion to full professor is almost as important as the promotion to asso-
ciate professor. Re-appointments in the German university system offer comparatively low gains and are 
thereby not enough attractive to induce a significant increase in research output . Therefore, incentives and 
publication productivity are highest early in the career of German researchers leveling off on a lower but 
decent level afterwards. For US researchers the situation is different. Their research output is not only sig-
nificantly higher prior to their first appointment but also prior to a promotion to full professor, indicating 
that this promotion provides a second effective incentive to foster research output over a longer period of 
time. However, after promotion to full professor research output also levels off at a significantly lower 
level. To conclude, career incentives are induced by national higher education institutions and they are 
decisive to explain individual publication patterns and systematic differences in publication patterns of 
German and US researchers. 
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1 Introduction 
Research productivity is not constant over the lifetime of a researcher but fluctuates sub-
stantially and often seems to follow a typical pattern. Lehman (1953, 1958, 1966) was 
among the first to systematically analyze such patterns by using cross-sectional data. He 
studied the relation between age and scientific productivity and found that a sharp in-
crease in productivity at the beginning is followed by a decline in the later part of a re-
searcher’s career. The age of maximum output differs somewhat from discipline to disci-
pline and is located around the age of 30 to 45.1 Furthermore, this pattern is strongest for 
high-quality research. Using longitudinal data, Cole (1979) and Dennis (1956) find flatter 
career publication patterns but the same overall pattern across many disciplines. Some 
recent studies confirm these results for today’s economists: productivity rises at the be-
ginning and declines towards the end of the career [Kenny/Studley (1995); Hutchin-
son/Zivney (1995); Oster/Hamermesh (1998); Buchmueller/Dominitz/Hansen (1999)]. 
According to Goodwin/Sauer (1995) the career productivity profiles of US economists 
are best represented by fifth grade polynomials. Looking at institutional correlates, 
Goodwin/Sauer (1995) and Hutchinson/Zivney (1995) find a decline in publication out-
put of researchers after tenure has been granted, and Mahoney/Ready (1997) find that 
tenured economists publish fewer articles in refereed journals and proceedings than 
economists without tenure. Based on a sample of longitudinal data for 112 economists 
and business economists in the US and 189 in Germany we analyzed lifecycle publication 
patterns and find again very similar patterns. On average, our data show a sharp rise at 
the beginning of the academics’ careers and a decline afterwards. But despite these very 
stable aggregate patterns there is substantial variation of research output across individu-
als.2 
Therefore, we try to answer two questions in our paper: Firstly, how can differences in 
individual research productivity over the lifecycle be explained, and secondly, what im-
                                            
1 There are also systematic field specific patterns. According to Lehman, the maximum is reached at an 
earlier age in the hard sciences, and McDowell (1982) shows that career publication patterns are the flatter 
the faster knowledge becomes obsolete in a discipline. 
2 For more details see Schlinghoff 2003. 
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pact do national institutional peculiarities have? In section 2 we introduce a theoretical 
model in which research productivity is driven by a combination of incentives and skills, 
both of which depend on institutional characteristics of the national university systems 
and their respective career paths. Due to the importance of varying institutional settings 
we test our model in an international comparison. We look at Germany with a traditional 
European career system for researchers and the US with its well-known tenure-based 
career system. Although the two systems look quite different, they still have some func-
tional equivalents which are often overlooked but make them an ideal pair for compari-
son. Based on our theoretical model and the institutional details of the two countries, we 
derive testable hypotheses on similarities and differences in individual productivity pro-
files within and across countries in section 3. These are tested in section 4 on the basis of 
a unique data set of 112 (business) economists in the US and 189 in Germany. Finally, in 
section 5, we finish with a summary and some conclusions for future research. 
 
2 A model of research output in the academic career lifecycle 
Past explanations of career publication patterns were mainly based on optimal investment 
cycles. Two different types of investments were considered separately. Firstly, research-
ers invest in skills and knowledge which increases their productivity in the following 
period [McDowell (1982)]. Secondly, researchers invest in reputation by publishing their 
findings. Reputation pays off later in their career by higher income opportunities [Dia-
mond (1984; 1987); Levin and Stephan (1991)]. Both types of investments, i.e. invest-
ment in human capital and in reputation, are more profitable if they are made at the be-
ginning of a career. Therefore, both types of explanations predict a sharp rise of publica-
tion at the beginning of a career followed by a steady decline.3 Furthermore, in a recent 
paper Coupé/Smeets/Warzynski (2003) show a correlation between output of economists 
and promotion incentives. They show that - according to tournament theory - efforts of 
                                            
3 There is a subtle difference. The career publication patterns predicted by investments in skills lag behind 
the pattern predicted by reputation. The lag is due to the amount of time needed for learning. 
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assistant and associate professors increase with the wage spread from assistant/associate 
to full professorship. 
In the following section 2 we present a model which incorporates both types of invest-
ments under varying incentive structures, which are driven by differences in the higher 
education systems and their particular institutions. This allows us to show the impact of 
institutional differences on the investment decisions and derive hypotheses on lifetime 
productivity patterns. 
In our model we assume that a researcher's output depends on effort and skills. Variations 
of output over time are due to variations in these two variables. We further assume that 
productivity increases both in effort and in skills. However, skills firstly have to be ac-
quired before they can increase productivity and thereby output.4 In the screening period, 
production of output is slowed down, so there is a short term cost of investment in skills 
which pays off only later. Thus, researchers are faced with a trade-off between investing 
in skills and producing output. Their decision on how much and when to spend time on 
either of the two activities depends on the incentives given by their institutional environ-
ment, namely the incentives in the national higher education system. In general, we as-
sume that incentives in the university system arise from a tournament-like career system 
and/or from output-based pay schemes. Therefore, we use an extended tournament model 
to show how researchers allocate their efforts and investments over time. We further as-
sume that winning a tournament depends on research output and credentials.  
A researcher’s career is divided into two periods: a screening period that ends with an up-
or-out tournament decision and a second period, which is the tenure period for those who 
win the tournament and remain in the system. Losers are employed employment outside 
the university system in the second period. Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of events. In 
the screening period, researchers either invest in skills or exert production effort. Produc-
tion effort e1 produces research output y1 according to a production function p(e), p′ > 0, 
p′′ ≤ 0. However, research output is also affected by a random term z1,e: 
                                            
4 This assumption is in accordance with Baruch and Hall (2004) findings of the academic career system. 
They argue that a typical feature of the academic system is the practice of investing in formal education as 
part of the career development. Unlike in business, people in academe invest in themselves in an aim to 
increase their own human capital, which also includes lateral moves to create cross-functional experiences.  
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(1) y1 = p(e1) + z1,e, p′ > 0; p′′ ≤ 0. 
Investment in skills results in a skill level q according to a learning function g(h), g′ > 0, 
g′′ ≤ 0. However, due to measurement errors zh only a biased measure yh of skills is at-
tainable: 
(2) yh = q + zh = g(h) + zh 
 
Figure 1: Timing of the Model 
yResearcher de-
cides on e1 and h 
Realization of 
y1 and yh 
Researcher 
decides on e2 
Income 
if promoted: G + βy2
if not promoted: V 
if y >  : pro-
motion 
 
Research output in the second period depends on production effort e2 and skills q ac-
quired in the first period. Research output in period 2 is also affected by a random term 
z2,e: 
(3) y2 = p2(e2, q) + z2,e. 
Since production effort and investments are not observable in both periods and are af-
fected by random components, contracts can not be based on production effort or invest-
ment effort. The usual moral hazard problem arises: Without any incentives, researchers 
as selfish agents5 and maximize their own utility and choose inefficiently low levels of 
production and/or investment efforts. Since departments or universities as principals want 
their agents to choose efficient levels of effort, i.e. efforts balancing marginal costs and 
marginal outputs, they implement particular incentive structures. Within the screening 
period, incentives are provided by tournaments. Only the most productive and/or best 
                                            
5 In a detailed analysis of the major characteristics of academic career systems worldwide, Baruch and Hall 
(2004) also typify an academic as “a free agent” who can move his or her career and research agenda fairly 
easily from one university to another in order to make career progress. They further conclude that profes-
sors are much more committed to their profession than to their organization, which is nothing else than 
what economists mean by moral hazard or opportunistic behaviour.  
5 
qualified researchers are granted tenure.6 In the second period, after tenure has been 
granted, incentives are provided by some type of output-based pay. 
So w2 is a researcher’s income in the tenured period: 
(4) w2 = G + βy2, 0 ≤ β, 
where G is a senior researcher’s base salary and βy2 is the output-based pay component. 
Researchers who are not granted tenure after the screening period leave the system7 and 
receive an income V from an alternative job, V<G. 
 
Thus, the pay structure in the second period is 
 
 G + βy2,  if appointed to a tenured position 
(5) w2 = 
 V,  if not appointed to a tenured position. 
 
The relative performance measure that is used to determine the winner of the tournament 
is a weighted combination of the research output that is observed during the screening 
period and the observable qualification indicators a person received during the screening 
period.8 Research output can be measured by publications in journals (weighted or not) or 
by citations. Qualifications are measured by the credentials a person obtains, which - in 
the German case – is mainly the so-called “Habilitation”, a formal requirement to enter a 
lifetime position as a professor at a German university. So the combined performance 
measure of research output and qualification looks as follows 
                                            
6 Based on an extensive study of academic career systems, Peiperl and Baruch (1997) emphasize the impor-
tance of merit rather than time on the job for the academic promotion system. Unlike in classical bureauc-
racies or even in private industry where time on the job plays a more important role, in academe promotion 
depends on performance and the “standard” measure used is publication output. Baruch and Hall (2004) 
even argue that “academe came long before other sectors in focusing on results and outcomes rather than 
tenure” (p.251).  
7 Although it is argued that unlike in the business sector, career paths in the academic sector are multi-
directional, i.e. with movements up and down the hierarchy, we neglect this aspect in our analysis because 
downward movements have still been the rare exception in the past.  
8 Standard human capital theory states that an employee will invest in general skills. Thus, we have to an-
swer why a principal will provide incentives for acquiring general skills like research methods in tourna-
ments. However, standard human capital theory assumes that an employee will fully benefit from returns 
on human capital investments. But most times, research output is a public good. Researchers can not privat-
ize their returns on investments. To realize an efficient level of investments in the presence of positive 
spill-overs, investments in human capital must be subsidized [Weisbrod (1964)]. Because investment levels 
can not be agreed on by contract, we explore investment incentives in a tournament structure. 
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(6) y = αy1 + (1–α )yh,  [ ]1;0∈α  
Research output is weighted by α and qualifications are weighted by (1 – α). Researchers 
are granted tenure (hired for a tenured position) if their performance y exceeds their 
competitors’ performance y . 
On the other hand there are costs to production and investment efforts. In the screening 
period costs are twofold: the cost of production effort and the cost of skill investment 
effort: 
(7) C1 = C(e1 + h), C′ > 0, C′′ > 0. 
In the tenured period, the researchers’ costs only depend on their production effort, i.e. 
(8) C2 = C(e2). 
Neglecting time preferences and discount rates, lifetime income amounts to 
(9) L = V + P(e1, h)(G + βp2(e2, q) – V ) + w1 – C(e1 + h) – P(e1, h) C(e2),  
where w1 is a fixed wage in the screening period and 
(10) P(e1, h) = Pr [(αye + (1–α)yh) > (α ey  + (1–α) hy )]  
is the probability of winning the tournament. 
Risk-neutral researchers maximize their lifetime income by choosing levels of e1, h and 
e2. We solve the maximization problem by backward induction (figure 1). If researchers 
are granted a tenured position they have to choose an effort level e2 given the wage 
scheme (4), second period’s costs and skills q. The first order condition for optimal effort 
in the tenured period is: 
(11) )e('C
e
p
2
2
=∂
∂β . 
Effort increases in β and in the researcher’s marginal productivity
2e
p
∂
∂ . By definition, 
productivity is a strictly monotonic increasing function in skill level. Thus, second period 
effort is an implicit function of investments in the first period. We can show that 
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dh
de2 > 0,9 i.e. production effort in the tenured period increases with investments in the 
preceding period.10 Thus, investments have two impacts on research output in the tenured 
period. Firstly, a direct effect, i.e. investments in skills, making researchers more produc-
tive by increasing output productivity at a given effort level. Secondly, an indirect effect: 
investments in skills induce researchers to choose higher levels of effort in order to se-
cure their returns on human capital investments. Applying the implicit function theorem, 
output in the tenured period can be written as 
(12) y2 = (h) + zpˆ 2,e. 
 
Given the optimal decision in the tenured period, we can now analyze the decision prob-
lem in the screening period. We substitute (12) into (9) and obtain the following first or-
der conditions for homogenous agents 
(13) )he('C)V)h(pˆG)(0(f)e('p 11 +=−β+α , and 
(14) ).he('C
dh
pˆd5.0)V)h(pˆG)(0(f)h('g)1 1 +=β+−β+α−(  
Production effort and investment effort are determined by equations (13) and (14). The 
sum of production and investment effort increases in the wage spread, G – V, and in in-
centive intensity β. An increase in β acts like an indirect increase in the wage spread be-
cause of improved income opportunities in the tenured period. Let f(z), z = α(z1,e – z 1,e) + 
(1 – α)(zh – z h), be the joint density function of all random components. Then f(0) indi-
cates how well a researcher can influence the probability of winning the tournament by 
exerting production effort or by investing in skills. If f(0) is small, luck is dominant in 
determining the winner of the tournament. In this case, the tournament does not provide 
strong incentives. If f(0) is large, luck has only little impact on winning, so the tourna-
                                            
9 Schlinghoff 2003. 
10 If effort e2 and human capital g(h) are complementary inputs in the second period's production, then  
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ment provides higher incentives.11 Furthermore, as shown by Gibbs (2001), f(0) depends 
on the ratio of participants to the number of winners in the tournament. 
Substituting (13) into (14) yields 
(15) )V)h(pˆG)(0(f)e('p
dh
pˆd5.0)V)h(pˆG)(0(f)h('g)1 1 −β+α=β+−β+α−(  
Accordingly, we are able to derive three implications on the trade off between production 
effort and investment effort from our model: 
1. Fixed pay G in the tenured position: 
If we assume that research output is more important than credentials for winning the 
tournament , i.e.  
(16) α  ),h('g)1()e('p 1 α−>
then production effort increases in relation to investment effort if fixed pay G increases.12 
The intuition is that the wage spread G – V can only be gained by winning the tourna-
ment and, according to (16), it is easier to win the tournament by exerting higher produc-
tion efforts rather than by additional investments in skills. 
2. Variable pay β in the tenured period: 
A rise in β has two effects. First, a rise in β implies a larger wage spread, inducing the 
researcher to increase production effort relative to investment effort (like in the previous 
case). However, an increase in β leads to higher pay per output according to (12) and (4), 
which makes investing in skills in the first period more attractive because it allows pro-
ducing higher output later on in the career. 
3. Relative weight of output and qualification in the tournament decision: 
If the weight of research output α increases in the tenure decision, production effort in 
relation to investment effort increases in the screening period. 
 
                                            
11 These implications are fully compatible with the implications of standard tournament theory. If we set 
α=1 and β=0 our tournament structure perfectly matches the standard tournament of Lazear and Rosen 
(1981). 
12 If αp′(e1) ≤ (1–α)g′(h) researchers always prefer investments in the first period over production of output 
(reputation) because of their additional returns in the tenured period. 
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Hypotheses 
Summarizing the results of our model yields three hypotheses on how the trade-off be-
tween production effort and investment effort in the screening period is determined. The 
trade-off is determined by three factors: the wage spread G – V, the second period incen-
tive intensity β and the importance of research output α in relation to credentials for the 
tenure decision. However, we cannot make any predictions on the absolute level of pro-
duction or investment effort, but only on the relative effort of production and investment 
effort in the first and second period. This is sufficient for our research question, though, 
because we only want to explain variations in the shape of career publication patterns 
rather than their absolute level. Given the three hypotheses that we derived from our 
theoretical model we expect the following shapes of career publication patterns depend-
ing on the institutional incentives within a particular higher education system. 
Firstly, the higher the wage spread between tenured and untenured positions, the higher 
the research output in the screening period in relation to the tenured period. Secondly, the 
larger the incentive intensity in the tenured period, the lower is the research output in the 
screening period in relation to the tenured period. Thirdly, the higher the weight of re-
search output in relation to the weight of credentials for the promotion decision, the 
higher is the research output in the screening period in relation to the tenured period.  
In the next section we will apply these theoretical considerations to the incentive struc-
ture given by the typical career paths for German and US professors. Thereby, we obtain 
empirically testable hypotheses on comparative productivity profiles of US and German 
researchers. 
3 Institutional Incentives: the German and US University Ca-
reer Systems 
As we have shown in our theoretical analysis, differences in the wage spread (i.e. wage 
gains from one step of the promotion tournament to the next step), the decision criteria 
(relative weight of research output) and the output based pay of researchers cause sys-
tematic differences in lifetime productivity profiles. In order to test our model we there-
fore have to study career and pay systems that differ in these respects, in order to see 
10 
whether the predicted differences in productivity profiles occur as predicted. We take two 
sets of institutional settings for academic research, namely the US and German university 
systems. First we give an overview on the similarities and differences in the fundamental 
characteristics of the two university systems. We then study in more detail the career in-
centives and the pay for performance incentives in both systems to derive testable hy-
potheses on similarities or differences in lifecycle productivity profiles of US and Ger-
man economists..13 
 
3.1 General characteristics of the German and US University 
System 
 
Despite some major differences in the regulatory framework of German and US universi-
ties, there are many functionally equivalent institutions and regulations as we will explain 
in more detail below. This is very important for our study because only the similarities in 
the overall structure of the career systems make them suitable for a comparison of the 
impact of career differences. In contrast, the French career system, for example, with its 
universities and Grandes Écoles on one side and the CNRS – Centre National de la Re-
cherche Scientifique – on the other side, is quite different from the US and the German 
system.14 Thus, taking data from the French academic system without taking into account 
these fundamental differences resulting from legal, historical or institutional back-
grounds, would very likely only lead to statistical artifacts.15 So we have to concentrate 
on university systems that are functionally equivalent in their general structure. At the 
same time there has to be enough variation in the academic career system in order to be 
able to study the impact of career differences on publication productivity profiles. There-
fore, we chose to analyze the US and the Germany because their respective academic 
career systems allow us to study the impact of well specified differences in the career 
systems on individual productivity.  
                                            
13 Further details on the economics profession are given by Coupé (2004a). 
14 For more details see for example Altman and Bournois (2004). 
15 A similar argument is made by Stryker (2003), who argues that unless socioeconomists focus on law (…) 
they will fail to adequately understand capitalist democracies.  
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 Common characteristics of the academic career system 
In their classic study of the academic marketplace and particularly the academic careers, 
Caplow and McGee (1958) concluded already that the core characteristic of the academic 
career system is the so called vacancy-and-replacement mechanism. They consider this 
process, by which a department replaces its members, as central to the understanding of 
any academic institution. In their study they extensively analyze the inner workings of 
the governance mechanisms within a department, and Baruch and Hall (2004) conclude 
that the mechanisms Caplow and Mc Gee revealed in the late 1950s, still sound familiar 
and valid in today’s environment. Caplow and Mc Gee also describe the “nitty-gritty” 
details of the evaluation process, the kinds of credentials that were used and the important 
role of peer review and reputational measures for a career decision. Since reputation or 
prestige is determined in a very early stage of the career (mainly by number of citations 
and high-quality publications, which themselves are a function of the resources provided 
by a young researcher’s home institution and its prestige), Caplow and McGee conclude 
that an academic’s career is more or less set by the age of 40. This is consistent with the 
assumptions in our theoretical model whereby the first career step is characterized as a 
screening and investment period and the second period is an investment pay off period.16 
Baruch and Hall (2004) further argue that one important characteristic of career ad-
vancement in the academic sector in any country is that firstly, promotion is subject to 
performance (e.g. publications) rather than experience, and secondly, career advance-
ments are self-initiated” (p. 248).17 Furthermore, university systems are typically charac-
terized by flat hierarchies, usually consisting of three steps that typically make advance-
                                            
16 Although there are substantial changes in the academic profession due to a rapid extension and new in-
formation systems, the decision-making process itself has not substantially changed. Baruch and Hall 
(2004) find that “the judgement process, decisions about who participates in the hiring process, and the 
inter-unit negotiations within the university would all be quite familiar to Caplow and McGee” (p. 247). 
17 Taylor (1999) particularly emphasizes the global nature of the academic market, where researchers 
worldwide use a set of signals for their career aspirations. He also argues that these signals are built on 
reputation both of the individual/professional and institutional type. Baruch and Hall (2004) nowadays 
consider the concept of tenure to be a significant part of academic lives throughout the world. See also 
Baruch/Peiperl (2000). 
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ment a “non-issue after the person (…) attained senior rank” (p. 248).18 This again is a 
very important aspect for our study since it has major consequences for the incentive in-
tensity in the course of a typical academic’s career. It means that after having attained 
this last step in quite an early stage or age, there are no more incentives to exert high ef-
fort. 19  
 
Differences in the academic career systems of Germany and the US  
Despite the above mentioned similarities of academic career systems in general and those 
in Germany and the USA in particular, there are also substantial differences between the 
two systems. The higher education system in the US functions without centrally estab-
lished standards. It contains several thousand public and private institutions. There is a 
strong focus on elite and excellence, rather than on assuring common minimum standards 
of quality like in Germany. The US system is very hierarchical and serves multiple func-
tions which are reflected in the shifting balance between research and teaching on under-
graduate, graduate and post-graduate level. The German university system in contrast, is 
almost solely government funded and is based on the principle of equality of opportuni-
ties rather than on differentiation. In consequence, it is largely centralized and homoge-
neous [Adams (2002)] and the number of universities is much smaller in Germany. These 
differences have to be kept in mind when analyzing in more detail the career incentives in 
Germany and the US. 
                                            
18 Baruch and Hall (2004: 248) even argue that “there is nothing the world today, in any institutions, that 
approaches the level of security that is enjoyed by a tenured professor”. 
19 However, they also argue that since the 1990s the system is changing, with part-time and adjunct posi-
tions being one of the most important new characteristics of the system. As an example for a substantially 
new feature within the system they mention the so called “alternative tenure track” system of Boston Uni-
versity, where faculty can decide on two types of tenure track at the beginning of their career: the tradi-
tional track with tenure after six successful years, and the alternative track with a probationary tenure after 
six successful years, that has to be renewed after another ten successful years with a higher level of com-
pensation (10-20%) in exchange for their higher risk [Baruch and Hall (2004)].  
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3.2 Career Incentives in the German System20 
In Germany, unlike in the US, a doctoral dissertation used to be only the second last step 
towards a researcher’s career.21 Students who intend to follow a university career usually 
stay at their doctoral institution and are typically full time employed as senior assistants 
(Hochschulassistent).22 This is a temporary position with a maximum length of six years 
and no option to stay longer or even receive tenure. The assistant is assigned to a profes-
sor and teaches and works on research projects in consent with the professor.23 
                                            
20 Note however, that a recent amendment of the Higher Education Act (2002) proposes significant changes 
concerning the career paths of researchers at German universities and that the federal court turned down the 
amendment in July 2004. So our analysis may not be valid into the future, but it correctly describes the 
situation before 2002 since our publication data are all from the period before the new law was passed. 
Therefore, we restrict our institutional description to the old institutional rules. 
21 In this context it is worth mentioning that the majority of students who finish their doctoral degrees do 
not stay within the university system but leave the university system and work in private industry or in the 
public service sector. Thus, the doctoral dissertation is not a pure academic education but rather an ad-
vanced labor market and academic education.  
22 For a full description of the German Higher Education system cf. Ehlert and Cordier (2002). 
23 There are only very few exceptions to this rule, like writing on a Habilitation while receiving a research 
grant, but they are very rare and therefore not likely to be decisive in the career decision we are interested 
here. 
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During these six years the young researcher is expected to write a second thesis, the so 
called Habilitation24, which is a requirement to apply for a regular professorship. How-
ever, the young researcher must not apply for a professorship at the degree-granting insti-
tution. After finishing the Habilitation, the young researcher is on the job market compet-
ing in recruitment tournaments. All candidates that are on the market for a particular po-
sition at a given time are ranked by an internal recruiting committee according to their 
quality, and the job is offered to the first ranked candidate. If he or she accepts the job 
offer, he/she is granted tenure and receives an income according to an income scale that 
is fixed by law on a national level. German professors are lifetime civil servants, they 
cannot be laid off and their pension is completely taken care of by the state (according to 
a generously defined benefit plan). On the other hand, candidates who keep failing to win 
a recruitment tournament will have to look for employment opportunities outside the uni-
versity system, which are rare and much less attractive because job applicants with a Ha-
bilitation are often considered to be overqualified for “regular” jobs on the external la-
bour market. Therefore, losers of the first recruitment tournament often cannot expect a 
significant wage increase but will more likely even have to accept a decline in wage be-
cause of their over-qualification. 
For those who win the tournament and receive a “call”, the new job offers either a C3 or 
a C4 professorship position and the income is determined by the so-called C-scale (cf. 
table 1). The C-scale not only fixes the starting salary but also the salary increases, which 
are strictly tied to age and seniority, unless a researcher receives an outside job offer. In 
case of an outside job offer she can renegotiate the contract within fixed limits. 
Assistants are assigned to C1, which is about 2’500 EURO per month for the youngest 
age group. Total pay of C3 positions starts at about 2’800 EURO per month and that of 
C4 positions at about 3’500 EURO per month (if they are still in the youngest 
age/seniority group; see table 1 for base salaries in different ranks). The salary increase of 
                                            
24 The Habilitation is supposed to cover a different subject than the doctoral dissertation. It is supposed to 
prove that the candidate is able to cover more or less the whole field, i.e. of economics or business econom-
ics. After successful completion of the Habilitation the candidate is granted the so called venia legendi for 
her field, i.e. the permission to teach economics or business economics. An overview of all credentials 
offered in the German university system is given in Danesy (1994), 35ff. 
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a typical young researcher, who had been employed as an assistant with C1 salary in her 
previous position and is then appointed to a C4 professorship for the first time, amounts 
to approximately 1’500 EURO per month. Income increases following renegotiations due 
to outside job offers later in a career are usually smaller. There is a strict upper limit for 
renegotiating a contract to ward off an outside offer, amounting to around 600 EURO per 
month if the outside offer is a position within the German university system [Hartmer 
(1997)]. However, if the outside offer is from a foreign university or the private sector, 
the upper limit is substantially higher at around 3’552 EURO [Hartmer (1997)]. In addi-
tion to the monetary gains of winning the first recruitment tournament, the newly ap-
pointed professor also gains additional reputation and power, making it even more attrac-
tive to win the tournament. So the short term monetary gains of winning a first recruit-
ment tournament are quite substantial, whereas the options for further gains in subsequent 
tournaments are comparably small, at least so in the single tournament rounds. 
 
Table 1: Monthly base salaries of researchers at German universities in EURO 
Level of seniority C1 C2 C3 C4 
1 2521,57 2527,09 2782,76 3534,85 
2 2610,10 2668,18 2942,52 3720,98 
3 2698,63 2809,27 3102,26 3856,01 
4 2787,16 2950,36 3262,01 4016,61 
5 2875,69 3091,44 3421,76 4177,20 
6 2964,22 3232,53 3581,51 4337,78 
7 3052,74 3373,62 3741,26 4498,37 
8 3141,28 3514,71 3901,01 4658,95 
9 3229,81 3655,79 4060,76 4819,54 
10 3318,34 3796,88 4220,52 4980,12 
11 3406,87 3937,96 4380,26 5140,72 
12 3495,40 4079,05 4540,01 5300,28 
13 3583,92 4220,13 4699,76 5461,89 
14 3672,45 4361,22 4859,51 5607,13 
15 0 4502,31 5019,26 5783,06 
 Note: Data are from www.uni-tuebingen.de/uni/qqp/Besoldung.html. 
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3.3 Career Incentives in the US System 
In order to compare the career incentives for US25 and German university researchers we 
have to look for functional equivalents in the careers of researchers in the two countries. 
The first step towards a career as a researcher in the German system is the position of 
assistant, which is functionally equivalent to the position of an assistant professor in the 
US system. Both German assistants and US assistant professors hold a doctoral degree or 
PhD. In addition, both are employed on a temporary basis for about six years. The subse-
quent career step is a lifetime employment in academe, namely a tenured position in the 
US. However, there is one major difference. Assistant professors in the US are autono-
mous in teaching and research, whereas German assistants are still advised by tenured 
professors. Like in Germany, wages of US professors depend heavily on ranks. Table 2 
shows average wages of US researchers by rank and the Carnegie Classification of the 
employing university. Other than the German system, where there is one dominant career 
step from assistant to full professor, the US system knows two major steps. The first is 
from assistant professor to associate professor with a large increase in employment secu-
rity because it is tenured but a rather modest increase in income.26 The second step is 
from associate professor to full professor with a larger increase in income, particularly at 
research universities. In addition to the monetary gains, young researchers also gain repu-
tation if promoted from assistant to associate professor and they gain even more reputa-
tion if promoted to full professor or even to a distinguished chair. 
 
                                            
25 The whole US higher education system is much less regulated than the German system, however. Even 
though Trow (1993) argues that the American post-secondary education is uncoordinated from the centre 
and without national standards for (…) the appointment of academic staff, or the rewarding of degrees, we 
still try to describe broad commonalities which only slightly vary between different types of universities or 
from state to state, etc. 
26 In nearly all cases of our data set, receiving tenure goes along with the promotion to the associate rank. 
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Table 2: Salaries of researchers at US universities in US Dollars per year 
 Public Private 
Doctoral Institutions   
Full 82535 103761 
Associate 58741 67661 
Assistant 49100 58577 
Comprehensive Institutions   
Full 66657 71547 
Associate 53143 55384 
Assistant 43361 44836 
Baccalaureate Institutions   
Full 60446 70528 
Associate 49686 52137 
Assistant 41472 42819 
 Note: Data are from http://www.chronicle.com/stats/aaup. 
 
So the short term gains of winning the first recruitment tournament from assistant to as-
sociate professor are substantial in terms of employment security, but not so much in 
terms of monetary gains or reputation. At the same time, the options for further gains in 
subsequent tournaments in terms of income increase or reputation establishment are rela-
tively high when compared with the German system. If we translate these institutional 
differences into terms of tournament theory, we will find both similarities and differences 
in the prize structure for US and German researchers. 
Firstly, in both countries, there is an extraordinarily large winner's prize for winning the 
first round of the tournament due to becoming tenured, which is the all dominant factor in 
the first step. The incentives are therefore basically identical in the German and the US 
system. In both countries we expect similar and substantial efforts to produce research 
output while being assistant/associate professor, and a decline in effort after the first 
promotion due to comparatively lower potential gains in the following tournaments. 
Secondly, the prize structure in the US and Germany differs systematically in the subse-
quent rounds of the tournament. As described in the previous paragraph, a promotion to 
full professorship in the US bears higher income and reputation gains than a second or 
third call in Germany. We expect the prospect of being promoted to full professor in the 
US to create higher incentives than the prospect of receiving a second or third call in 
Germany. Therefore, effort should be higher for a US associate professor competing for 
full professorship than for a German professor competing for a second or third call. Re-
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spectively, the decline in effort after becoming a full professor should be higher in the US 
than after a second or third call in Germany. 
3.4 Promotion decision criteria 
As described in the previous section, the most important criterion to become appointed as 
a tenured professor in Germany is a qualification criterion, namely the Habilitation. It 
consists of a thesis and an oral colloquium on a subject which must not be the same sub-
ject as the Habilitation (which is chosen on short notice by a committee out of a list of 
three subjects, all of which must not be related to the Habilitation). Therefore, the Ger-
man system places high emphasis on a broad range of skills that a young researcher has 
to acquire before he or she is granted his/her Habilitation. This is the drop-out criterion of 
the first round of the tournament. In addition, it has been shown that the probability of 
becoming appointed to a tenured professorship in Germany increases with the number of 
publications [cf. Schlinghoff (2002)], but it is still subject to having finished the Habilita-
tion in the first place. 
On the contrary, the single most important criterion for the tenure decision in the US sys-
tem is the number of (high-quality) publications (as a number of empirical studies have 
shown). Boyer (1990), for example, asked faculty members what criteria they considered 
to be important for the decision to receive tenure. 95% of faculty employed at research 
universities (89% of professors employed at doctorate granting universities) stated that 
receiving tenure without having any publication is very difficult (if not impossible). 95% 
(91% respectively) state that the number of publications has a major influence on tenure 
decisions. 83% (73%) consider the journal in which the paper is published to be very 
important for the tenure decision. In contrast, only 10% (19%) consider evaluations of 
students to be very important for tenure committees. After receiving tenure, promotion 
from associate to full professorship is a second career step within the US system. By 
comparing associate and full professors of the same age, Fishe (1998) shows that full 
professors have a higher average annual research output than associate professors. In ad-
dition to differences in total output, the quality of papers also varies for full and associate 
professors. Full professors publish a significantly higher percentage of papers in top jour-
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nals than associate professors. Furthermore, Fishe's findings indicate that quality of re-
search matters more for the promotion from associate to full professor than for the tenure 
decision. 
To summarize, in the German system there is a stronger emphasis on qualification meas-
ures in the screening period than in the US system. In our model, this translates into a 
lower α, i.e. a lower weight of research output in the screening period, which makes in-
vestment in skills (even on the cost of trading in research output) more attractive in the 
German system than in the US system.27 
Therefore, career publication profiles of German researchers should be relatively lower in 
the first period in comparison to later periods due to higher incentives to invest in skills at 
the beginning. In contrast, we expect the research output of US researchers to be higher 
in the first period than in later periods because of a concentration of incentives on short-
term research output in the screening period. 
3.5 Incentives due to output-based pay 
Unlike Germany, the US system provides output-based income incentives on top of the 
tournament incentives described above. A number of studies have empirically analyzed 
the correlation between pay and research output of US researchers. One of the main find-
ings is that variations in income are related more closely to variations in research output 
the more research-oriented a researcher’s department is [Ragan/Warren/Bratsberg (1999), 
Moore/Newman/Turnbull (1998), Swidler/Goldreyer (1998), Gomez-Mejia/Balkin 
(1992), Hamermesh/Johnson/Weisbrod (1982)]. Thus, professors in research universities 
will receive higher returns for additional effort to produce research output than professors 
in teaching universities. This means that incentive intensity (β) is higher in US research 
universities than in US teaching universities, which, according to our model, means that 
professors at research universities will invest comparatively more in skills during the 
screening period than their colleagues at teaching universities because of higher returns 
                                            
27 Note that the German system has started to change rapidly since the end of the 1990s, converging with 
the US system. Publications in prestigious journals have become more and more important. At the same 
time, the classical Habilitation has become less important and may be totally abolished in the years to come 
due to a new federal law. However, for the period analyzed in this paper, the Habilitation was still the 
dominant criterion. 
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on investments later on. Therefore, we predict that the career publication profiles of pro-
fessors at research universities are influenced by their investments in skills in the first 
period (making the profile less steep at the beginning in comparison to the second career 
stage). Contrarily, publication profiles of professors at teaching universities are influ-
enced less by skill investments in the first period and are more focused on producing out-
put, making the profiles comparatively steeper in the first career stage. 
 
4 Empirical findings on career publication profiles 
The data set 
To test our implications, we collected data from 189 German researchers and 112 US 
researchers in economics and business economics. The data are drawn from the personal 
CVs of the researchers, complemented by information collected via internet search. All 
German professors in the data set were appointed as professor before 1999. To obtain our 
German sample, we searched all faculty homepages of West German business and eco-
nomics departments. We crosschecked our sample with secondary data from En-
ders/Bornemann (2002) and Weber/Kaminski (1994). Similar to Germany, all US-
professors in the data set were granted tenure before 1999. For the US data we drew a 
sample of about 1’400 faculty members and asked them by email to provide us with a CV 
and a list of their publications. The response rate was 7% and random cross checks of the 
given information indicated a high quality of response. For both samples we have a fairly 
representative distribution across cohorts and sub-specializations within the two fields of 
economics and business economics. 
Dependent variable 
Research output was measured by a weighted number of publications in journals and ed-
ited books. We counted publication output in three categories: articles in top journals, 
articles in other journals and articles in edited books. Because German researchers pub-
lished only a small fraction of their research output in international journals during the 
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period that we analyze (see table 3), we would miss a major part of their publications if 
we considered international (top) journals only. Consequently, we have to account for the 
importance of German journals for promotion decisions in Germany28. Not only do we 
have to include German journals into our analysis but we also have to identify German 
top journals, which for the German academic market are functionally equivalent to inter-
national top journals for the US academic market. Schlinghoff and Backes-Gellner 
(2002) identify four German top journals for each economics and business economics. In 
business economics these are: Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, Zeitschrift für betriebs-
wirtschaftliche Forschung, Die Betriebswirtschaft and Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung 
und Praxis. In economics they specify: Kyklos, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissen-
schaft (Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics), Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 
and Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik. Citation analysis indicates that these 
journals are cited approximately four to eight times more often than other German jour-
nals. 
To keep chances for publishing in a top journal equal for German and US researchers, we 
have to take into account that there are much more international (English language) jour-
nals than German journals, and that at the same time there are much more US than Ger-
man researchers. Therefore, we chose the number of international top journals in a way 
that gives US-researchers the same chance to publish a paper in an international top jour-
nal as it gives German researchers to publish in a German top journal. The appropriate 
numbers of international journals are 12 in economics and 20 in business economics. 
Based on this fundamental decisions we classify the following journals as international 
top journals from preceding rankings29: Academy of Management Journal, Academy of 
Management Review, Accounting Review, Administrative Science Quarterly, Harvard 
Business Review, International Journal of Production Research, Journal of Accountancy, 
Journal of Accounting & Economics, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Adver-
                                            
28 The importance of German journals has been changing rapidly in recent years. However, during the time 
span we are analyzing, they were still very important. 
29 Laband/Piette 1994, Diamond 1989, Williams 1987, Niemi 1988, Jobber/Simpson 1988, Hammel-
mann/Mazze 1973, Mabry/Sharplin 1985, Alexander/Mabry 1994, Mc Rae 1974, Tahai/Rigsby 1998, 
Doyle/Arthurs 1995, Gho et al (1996), Vokurka 1996. For more details see Schlinghoff 2003. 
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tising Research, Journal of Business, Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Finance, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal 
of Marketing, Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 
Management Science, Organizational Behaviour & Human Decision Process, Journal of 
Political Economy, Review of Economic Studies, American Economic Review, Economet-
rica, Journal of Economic Literature, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activities, Bell Journal of Economics (Rand Journal of Economics), Review 
of Economics, Journal of Monetary Econics, Economica, and International Economics 
Review. 
To calculate the individual publication output per year, we use a weighted publication 
index. Citation analyses of international journals indicate that our findings on relative 
citation rates of German top journals to other journals is appropriate for US journals as 
well. By weighting top journals with a factor eight we are at the upper bound of various 
quality weights and thereby strongly emphasize quality of research in our publication 
indicator. Thus, we multiply articles in German top journals or international top journals 
by eight, articles in other journals or in edited books by two for German researchers. For 
researchers from the US, articles in international top journals are also multiplied by eight, 
articles in other journals or edited books by one. To get an unbiased dependent variable 
for career publication profiles we use three-year averages, since single year outputs vary 
strongly due to specific research production cycles and varying timing issues in the pub-
lication process of different journals and books. 
First descriptive analyses provide the following results for our dependent variable. US 
researchers publish, on average, 0,082 articles in top journals, 0,49 articles in other jour-
nals and 0,21 articles in edited books per year (cf. table 3). 
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Table 3: Average publication output per year 
 GTJ GOJ GP ITJ IOJ IP PUB 
German researchers 0,1091 0,4379 0,6430 0,0064 0,1028 0,1149 1,4141 
 7,7% 31,0% 45,5% 0,5% 7,3% 8,1% 100% 
US researchers    0,0818 0,4925 0,2091 0,781 
    10,4% 62,8% 26,7% 100% 
First row indicates number of publications. 
GTJ: German top journals. GOJ: other German journals. GP: German proceedings. ITJ: International top journals. 
IOJ: other international journals. IP: International proceedings. 
PUB: total publication output 
Second row indicates the share of the category in the total publication output. 
 
If we compare these results with those for German researchers and only look at publica-
tions in international journals, the dominance of US researchers in international top jour-
nals is obvious. German researchers published on average only 0,006 articles in interna-
tional top journals, and 0,1028 in other international journals. However, if we add publi-
cations in national journals, we find nearly the same average publication output for Ger-
man and US researchers in their respective journal markets. In total, German researchers 
produce 0,115 articles in top journals and 0,541 articles in other journals.30 
As a dependent variable in our regression analysis we use an individually standardized 
publication indicator (OUTPUTt,i). We use the standardized output because in order to 
test our hypotheses we are only interested in the shape of the lifecycle publication profile 
but not in the absolute level of a researcher’s lifecycle publication output (t is measured 
in years after finishing the PhD). Another reason for standardizing is that overall research 
output is not only influenced by individual effort or skills but also by his or her field of 
specialization or by other unobserved heterogeneity in a researcher's productivity. By 
standardizing each individual researcher’s publication output to zero mean and unity 
variance we account for exogenous differences in individual research output.31 Thus, 
OUTPUTt,i represents the output of individual i at time t compared to his or her own av-
erage over his or her whole career. If OUTPUTt,i is greater than zero, a researcher pro-
                                            
30 In addition, German researchers publish 0,658 articles in edited books. 
31 Alternatively, we could estimate first differences or fixed effects, which are very similar to standardiza-
tion. However, first differences and fixed effects estimate the absolute variation in the dependent variable. 
Since our model predicts only relative variations, we prefer to use the individually standardized publication 
output. Furthermore, individual standardization enables us to compare publication profiles of German and 
US researchers without having to answer questions on the relative value of articles in German vs. interna-
tional top journals. 
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duces more at the time t than his or her average et vice versa. We additionally analyze the 
influence of our explanatory variables on the weighted, quality-adjusted research output 
OUTPUTWEIGHt,i. 
 
Explanatory Variables 
The most important explanatory variables, according to our model, are the various career 
steps in Germany and the US. On average, the first career step (screening period) in the 
US lasts 5 to 6 years (i.e. time from finishing a PhD to receiving tenure).32 Time to tenure 
has increased in the last decades. Researchers, for example, who were granted tenure 
before 1980, received their tenured position 0,8 years faster than researchers who were 
granted tenure after 1980. The second career step, i.e. promotion to full professor, takes 
again six or more years. In addition to these major career steps in rank, we observe a sub-
stantial number of horizontal career steps. On the level of assistant professor, 21 re-
searchers reported that they changed their university. After receiving tenure, 32 profes-
sors reported that they were offered the option to change their university. 
 
 
Table 4: Time to promotions 
             Average time spent between 
US PhD Assistant 
Assistant 
Tenure 
Associate 
Full 
Research I 0,43 5,14 4,93 
Research II 0,62 5,80 6,31 
Doctorate I -0,32 4,00 7,29 
Doctorate II 0,31 7,40 6,00 
College 0,26 5,95 7,18 
Average 0,42 5,63 6,05 
 
 
Germany 
Doctorate 
“Habilitation” 
“Habilitation” 
First App. 
First App. 
Re-app. 
All universities 6,00 1,37 6,00 
 Source: Own Calculations 
 
 
                                            
32 See table 4 for detailed times spent on each position. 
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The first career step (screening period) in Germany, i.e. the time from finishing the doc-
toral degree to finishing the Habilitation, lasts approximately six years, too. Further ca-
reer steps are outside job offers (calls) from other universities. About two thirds of all 
professors receive at least one more job offer, and more than one third receive at least 
two. On average, German researchers are re-appointed about twice during their career. 
The average time from the first professorship to the first outside job offer is six years and 
to the second outside job offer is another five years. 
 
If we compare the length of the different career steps, we find that the first career step 
(screening period) and the next career step period require approximately the same time in 
the US and in the German university system, despite the substantial differences in institu-
tional details that we observe in the two countries. 
 
Figure 2: Graphical representation of the regression model 
OUTPUTt
incentive effects incentive effects 
t – 1 t + 1t 
PROMOTIONt – 1 PROMOTIONt 
COMPETITIORSt 
COMPETITORSSQt
PROMOTIONt+1 
COMPETITIORSt+1 
COMPETITORSSQt+1 qualification effects 
EXP 
EXPSQ 
 
Results 
To test our implications we estimate separate linear regression models for US and Ger-
man researchers with OUTPUTt,i as the dependent variable (see figure 2) and the various 
career steps (promotions) as explanatory variables. 
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PROMOTIONt,i represents a career step for individual i at time t. For US researchers we 
distinguish between promotion to a tenured position (TEN), promotions to full professor 
(FULL) and horizontal career steps (same position, other university) on the assistant (SO-
ASSI), associate (SO–ASSO) and full professor level (SO–FULL). For German research-
ers, we identify first appointments to a professorship (FIRST_APP) and re-appointments 
(RE_APP). 
PROMOTIONt+1,i represents a promotion in the period after the actual publication output, 
while PROMOTIONt-1,i represents a promotion in the period before the actual publication 
output. 
According to our model, we expect relative publication output of researcher i at time t to 
be higher if a researcher is on the market for promotions in the following period (PRO-
MOTIONt+1,i = 1), so there is an incentive to work hard on research output in the previ-
ous period. But we do not expect positive career incentives right after a promotion has 
taken place, so research output of researcher i after a promotion (PROMOTIONt-1 = 1) 
should not exceed his/her average level of productivity. If at all, research output after 
promotion should be lower due to a loss of career incentives.33 
In addition to these career events, we are able to incorporate the number of jobs in the 
academic labor market for German researchers, which can be used as an indicator for the 
number of contestants in a given promotion tournament. The variables COMPETI-
TORSt,i, and COMPETITORSSQt,i (COMPETITORSt+1,i and COMPETITORSSQt+1,i) 
represent the labor market chances of German junior researchers measured by the ratio of 
the number of potential candidates (researchers who plan to finish their Habilitation 
within the next three years) to the number of vacant positions (number of expected job 
openings within the next three years). These data are provided by Borchert and Gülicher 
(1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994) for three year periods and for different specialities. 
The variables EXP and EXPSQ represent the researcher’s (squared) total job experience 
in years. RESEXP and RESEXPSQ are interaction terms between EXP (EXPSQ) and a 
dummy variable indicating whether the academic is employed by a research university 
                                            
33 Since in Germany a newly appointed professor has to establish her new chair there is usually a short 
term increase in teaching and administrative workload. Therefore, a decrease of research output below the 
average level is very likely in the first years after receiving tenure. 
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(as opposed to a teaching university). By adding a linear time trend t to the regression, we 
can also control for a general growth in the journal market. 
 
               ---------- table 5 around here ----------- 
 
Table 5 summarizes standardized regression coefficients for the US and the German 
sample, respectively. All implications regarding the promotion variables are borne out in 
the data. Research output is significantly higher in the period preceding a promotion 
(positive sign of PROMOTIONt+1,i). Furthermore, as expected, research output is not 
higher, but on an average level (or even below average level) in the period following a 
promotion event (model I, US and Germany). 
If we split promotions into tenure decision and promotion to full professor for US re-
searchers (model II, US), we find that both types of promotions have almost the same 
impact on the weighted publication output of US researchers. We observe a significantly 
higher research output in the time period preceding the tenure decision, as well as in the 
time period before the promotion to full professor. Again, as expected, research output is 
not above average in the time period after the tenure decision was taken, respectively 
after the promotion to full professor has been granted since the incentive effect has then 
disappeared. 
If we split promotions into first appointments and re-appointments for German professors 
(model II, Germany), we find some differences to US researchers. First appointments 
have the same effects as the tenure decision in the US. Publication output is above aver-
age in the time period preceding the first appointment and drops to average afterwards. 
However, we do not find any significant effects of re-appointments on research output, 
which is in accordance with our prediction stating that potential gains in the first round of 
the promotion tournament are substantially higher than in following rounds, which in turn 
means that first appointments should have a greater impact on research output than re-
appointments. 
Against our expectations, our labor market variables COMPETITORS and COMPETI-
TORSSQ are not significant. We do not find evidence for research output to increase 
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with the number of contestants. However, this might as well be due to an incomplete la-
bor market indicator (for example due to the fact that the figures are not exactly the job 
openings but only the number of professorships, which only translates into job openings 
if we take the fluctuation rate of professors into account). 
If we look at the influence of experience on research output we will find a stronger influ-
ence of experience on research output for German researchers. This is due to the stronger 
incentives to invest in skills early in the career according to the selection criteria in the 
appointment process. Secondly, if we compare research and teaching oriented US univer-
sities, we expect to find a stronger influence of experience in research universities. This 
is due to higher returns on investments, since income depends more on research output. 
The regression results for German researchers meet our expectation. Job experience has a 
very strong significant influence on both quality-adjusted research output and number of 
publications. We do not find a significant influence of experience on weighted publica-
tions for US researchers in general, though. Furthermore, there is a positive though not 
significant correlation between the interaction of research universities34 and experience as 
well as publication output. For an academic employed by a research university, publica-
tion effort is influenced to a higher degree by experience. If we run the regression only 
for individuals who are employed by research universities, we find a significant correla-
tion between experience and publications. By comparing standardized regression coeffi-
cients, we find that experience is more important for German researchers than for US 
researchers. 
 
5 Conclusions 
In our paper we analyze differences in individual research productivity over the lifecycle 
and study the impact of two different academic career systems, namely of the US and of 
the German system. We argue that variations in lifecycle publication patterns are driven 
by a combination of incentives to publish and to invest in skills, both of which depend on 
particular institutional characteristics of national university systems. On the one hand, 
                                            
34 Research universities were defined according to the Carnegie Classification scheme. 
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publication patterns of US and German researchers are determined by the same basic 
mechanism: incentives to publish are provided by promotion tournaments, which result in 
increased publication outputs in time periods preceding a promotion and a decline in pub-
lication productivity after a promotion. On the other hand we identify some striking dif-
ferences between US and German researchers, which can be related to particular differ-
ences in the design of the career paths of researchers and cause the following results: 
Firstly, skill acquisition is more important for German researchers in the screening period 
since the first promotion decision is strongly influenced by a qualification requirement, 
the so-called Habilitation. Secondly, German researchers lack a second major career step 
in comparison to US researchers, for whom the promotion to full professor is almost as 
important as the promotion to associate professor. Re-appointments in the German uni-
versity system offer comparatively low gains and are thereby not attractive enough to 
induce researchers to increase their effort significantly. For US researchers the situation 
is different. Their research output is significantly higher prior to a promotion to full pro-
fessor, indicating that this promotion provides an effective incentive to increase research 
output. 
Since we are looking at individually standardized research output, we cannot state that 
one or the other career system is overall superior. If we only consider publications in in-
ternational journals we find a clear predominance of US researchers. However, in the 
past, German economists and business economists have had a strong incentive to publish 
in national rather than international journals. Thus, it would be against the logic of the 
German system to compare the efficiency of the German and US system by just compar-
ing the number of publications in international (English speaking) journals at least for the 
given time period. If, on the contrary, we compare publications in German top journals 
for German researchers with publications in Anglo-Saxon journals for US researchers, 
the gap becomes much smaller, and if we compare articles in all journals, there is no dif-
ference in research productivity at all. So it is reasonable to conclude, that researchers 
generally react to promotion criteria by adjusting their production and investment behav-
ior. For the promotion to full professor in the US, and for a first appointment to professor 
in Germany, publications in the nation-specific top journals were most important in the 
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period we studied. As a reaction, researchers who competed in these tournaments had a 
strong incentive to produce publications in their respective top journals, and this is ex-
actly what they did. US researchers worked hard on publications in Anglo-Saxon journals 
in order to receive tenure and German researchers worked hard to publish in German 
journals in order to receive their first call as professor.  
Over the last years, the promotion criteria of German economists and business econo-
mists have started to shift substantially towards a greater importance of publications in 
international journals. Therefore, we expect the publication behavior of young research-
ers to adjust accordingly, meaning that we should expect a significantly higher amount of 
German research publications in international journals in the near future (which is al-
ready quite obvious particularly in economics and becoming more and more obvious in 
business economics). At the same time there is a tendency towards more contingent em-
ployment arrangements in the US university system with a substantial increase in adjunct 
faculty from 20% part-time or temporary faculty members in 1967 to 43% in 2000 
(Feldman and Turnley 2004). Since recent developments suggest that the use of adjunct 
faculty will continue in the future, we also expect the US publication profiles to change 
or rather split: traditional tenure track faculty are remaining with the old pattern, and the 
increasing number of adjunct faculty developing completely new focuses and patterns of 
productivity profiles depending on the incentives set in the new types of contracts. 
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Germany USA Germany USA Germany USA Germany USA
t 0,128*** 0.073 0,081* 0.066 0,193*** 0,157*** 0,147*** 0,148*
EXP 0,808*** 0.286 0,851*** 0.324 0,905*** 0,447* 0,924*** 0,539**
EXPSQ -0,670*** -0,230 -0,640*** -0,246 -0,702*** -0,320 -0,653*** -0,391
RESEXP 0.218 0.276 0.199 0.197
RESEXPSQ -0,210 -0,257 -0,204 -0,222
COMPETITIONt+1 0.082 0.056 -0,043 -0,075
COMPETITIONSQt+1 -0,092 -0,071 0.023 0.050
COMPETITIONt -0,069 -0,064 0.112 0.116
COMPETITIONSQt 0.058 0.054 -0,096 -0,100
PROMOTIONt+1 0,069*** 0,162*** 0.043 0,128***
PROMOTIONt 0.012 0,156*** 0.022 0,092**
PROMOTIONt-1 -0,057* -0,050 0.001 -0,073*
FIRST_APPt+1 0,134*** 0,107***
FIRST_APPt 0,093*** 0,099***
FIRST_APPt-1 0.041 0,088***
RE_APPt+1 -0,001 -0,012
RE_APPt -0,031 -0,025
RE_APPt-1 -0,033 0.031
TENt+1 0,182*** 0,146***
TENt 0,141*** 0,080*
TENt-1 -0,048 -0,046
FULLt+1 0,126*** 0.064
FULLt 0,136*** 0.056
FULLt-1 -0,170*** -0,068
SO-ASSIt+1 -0,001 0.013
SO-ASSIt 0.069 0,072*
SO-ASSIt-1 0.014 0.008
SO-ASSOt+1 -0,016 -0,010
SO-ASSOt -0,004 -0,033
SO-ASSOt-1 -0,058 -0,049
SO-FULLt+1 0.018 0.038
SO-FULLt 0.005 0.058
SO-FULLt-1 0.037 0.056
* Significant on the 10% level
** Significant on the 5% level
*** Significant on the 1% level
OUTPUTWEIGH OUTPUT
Table 5: Promotions and research output
Model I Model II Model I Model II
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